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a b s t r a c t
We study the problem of securely extending the domain of a collision resistant
compression function. A new construction based on directed acyclic graphs is described.
This generalizes the usual iterated hashing constructions. Our main contribution is to
introduce a new technique for hashing arbitrary length strings. Combined with DAG-based
hashing, this technique yields a new hashing algorithm. The amount of padding and the
number of invocations of the compression function required by the new algorithm is
smaller than the general Merkle–Damgård algorithm.
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1. Introduction
Hash functions are a basic cryptographic primitive and are used extensively in digital signature protocols. For such
applications, a hash function must satisfy certain necessary properties including collision resistance and pre-image
resistance. Collision resistance implies that it should be computationally intractable to find two elements in the domain
which are mapped to the same element in the range. On the other hand, pre-image resistance means that given an element
of the range (called the target), it should be computationally intractable to find its pre-image. There are several ways of
formalizing this notion, the target can be random; the element of the domain for determining the target can be randomly
chosen; or in case of a keyed family of hash functions, for a chosen target and a randomly chosen function, it should be
computationally infeasible to find a pre-image (see [7]).
Construction of collision resistant and pre-image resistant hash functions are of both practical and theoretical interest.
Most practical hash functions are designed from scratch. The advantage of designing a hash function from scratch is that one
can use simple logical/arithmetic operations to design the algorithm and hence achieve very high speed. The disadvantage
is that we obtain no proof of collision resistance. Hence a user has to assume that the function is collision resistant. A well-
accepted intuition in this area is that it is more plausible to assume a function to be collision resistant when the domain is
fixed (and small) rather than when it is infinite (or very large). A fixed domain function which is assumed to be collision
resistant is often called a compression function.
For practical use, it is required to hash messages of arbitrary lengths. Hence, one must look for methods which extend
the domain of a compression function in a “secure” manner, i.e., the extended domain hash function is collision resistant
provided the compression function is collision resistant. Any method which achieves this is often called a composition
principle.
Composition principles based on iterated applications of the compression function are known and these are called
variants of the Merkle–Damgård algorithm [3,4]. The most general of these algorithms can hash arbitrarily long messages
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and assumes the compression function to be only collision resistant. Other variants can hash messages of a maximum
possible length or assumes the compression function to be both collision resistant and pre-image resistant. See Section 3
for a detailed discussion of several variants of the Merkle–Damgård algorithm.
Our contributions. In this paper, we are concerned with the problem of constructing a hash function which can hash
arbitrarily long messages and which can be proved to be collision resistant under the assumption that the compression
function is only collision resistant. To justify the non-triviality of the problem we describe a construction which can be
proved to be secure if the compression function is both collision resistant and pre-image resistant while it is insecure if the
compression function is only collision resistant.
The first step in our construction is to consider a very general class of domain extending algorithms. The structure of any
algorithm in the class that we consider can be described using a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In Section 5, we provide a
construction of a secure domain extending algorithm using an arbitrary DAG. The Merkle–Damgård algorithm uses a dipath
and is a special case of DAG-based algorithms.
Our main contribution (in Section 6) is a new technique for hashing arbitrary length strings using DAG-based algorithms.
The resulting algorithm improves upon the general Merkle–Damgård algorithm both in terms of padding length and number
of invocations of the compression function.
2. Preliminaries
We write |x| for the length of a string x; and x1 ‖ x2 for the concatenation of two strings x1 and x2. The reverse of the string
x will be denoted by xr . By an (n,m) function we will mean a function which maps {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m. All logarithms in the
paper are in base two.
For n > m, let h be an (n,m) function. Two n-bit strings x, x′ ∈ X are said to collide for h, if x 6= x′ but h(x) = h(x′). A
hash function h : X → Y is said to be collision resistant if it is computationally intractable to find collisions for h. A formal
definition of this concept requires the consideration of a family of functions (see [3,5]).
In this paper, we are interested in “securely” extending the domain of a hash function. More precisely, given an (n,m)
function h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, with n > m+ 1, we construct a function h∞ : ∪i≥1{0, 1}i → {0, 1}m, such that one can prove
the following: Given any collision for h∞, it is possible to obtain a collision for h. The last statement is formalized in terms of
a Turing reduction between two suitably defined problems (see below). The advantage of this method is that we only prove
a reduction and at no point are we required to use a formal definition of collision resistance. There have been several works
which have used this approach to the study of hash functions including the early work by Bellare and Rogaway [1], followed
by Stinson [9] and more recently by Rogaway [6].
We now turn to the task of defining our approach to reducibilities between different problems related to the property of
collision resistance. Consider the following problem as defined in [9].
Problem : Collision Col(n,m)
Instance : An (n,m) hash function h.
Find : x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that x 6= x′ and
h(x) = h(x′).
By an (, q) (probabilistic) algorithm for Collision we mean an algorithm which invokes the hash function h at most q times
and solves Col(n,m)with probability of success at least .
The domain of h is the set of all n-bit strings. We would like to extend the domain to the set of all non-empty binary
strings, i.e., to construct a function h∞ : ∪i≥1{0, 1}i → {0, 1}m. We would like to relate the difficulty of finding collisions for
h∞ to that of finding collisions for h. Thus, we consider the following problem.
Problem : Arbitrary length collision ALC(n,m, L)
Instance : An (n,m) hash function h and an integer L ≥ 1.
Find : x, x′ ∈ ∪Li=1{0, 1}i such that x 6= x′ and
h∞(x) = h∞(x′).
By an (, q, L) (probabilistic) algorithm A for Arbitrary length collision we will mean an algorithm that makes at most q
invocations of the function h and solves ALC(n,m, L)with probability of success at least .
Later we show Turing reductions from Collision to Arbitrary Length Collision. Informally, this means that given oracle
access to an algorithm for solving ALC(n,m, L) for h∞ it is possible to construct an algorithm to solve Col(n,m) for h. These
will show that our constructions preserve the intractability of finding collisions.
Pre-image resistance:
This is an important property for cryptographic hash functions. Informally, this means that given y ∈ {0, 1}m, it is
computationally infeasible to find an x, such that f (x) = y. As mentioned earlier, there are several ways to formalize this
notion depending on which quantity is chosen at random. The target y can be chosen at random; or the quantity x used for
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obtaining the target can be chosen at random. Another notion called everywhere pre-image security has been defined in [7].
This notion is defined for a keyed family of hash functions. In this notion, for a chosen target point, and a randomly chosen
function from the family, it should be computationally infeasible to find a pre-image.
Pre-image resistance is a crucially important property on its own. On the other hand, this property is sometimes used to
prove the security of domain extending techniques for collision resistant hash functions. Suppose the domain of an (n,m)
hash function h is extended to obtain the hash function H(). For certain constructions [3], one can show that h∞ is collision
resistant if h is both collision resistant and pre-image resistant. We would like to emphasize that this is not the approach we
take in this paper. In our constructions, we will assume h to be only collision resistant.
3. Iterated hashing
In this section, we review iterative techniques for extending the domain of a collision resistant compression function.
These techniques are commonly called the Merkle–Damgård constructions [4,3].
Let h be an (n,m) compression function and IV be an m-bit string. Each of the domain extending methods described below
uses IV and h to construct a new function which can hash “long” strings to obtainm-bit digest. The IV can be chosen randomly,
but once chosen it cannot be changed and becomes part of the specification for the extended domain hash function.
3.1. Construction I: Basic iteration
We define a hash function H(I) whose domain consists of all binary strings whose lengths are multiples of (n− m). Let x
be a message whose length is i(n − m) for some i ≥ 1. We write x = x1‖ · · · ‖xi, where each xj is a string of length (n − m).
Define z1 = h(IV ‖ x1) and for j > 1, define zj = h(zj−1 ‖ xj). The digest of x under H(I) is defined to be zi, i.e., H(I) = zi.
The function H(I) can be proved to be collision resistant. Briefly, the argument proceeds as follows. Suppose x and x′ are
two strings such that x 6= x′ and H(I)(x) = H(I)(x′). If we have |x| = |x′|, then an easy backward induction shows that there
must be a collision for the function h. On the other hand, if |x| 6= |x′|, then it can be argued that the collision for H(I) either
leads to a collision for h or a pre-image of IV under h. Thus, if we assume that h is both collision resistant and pre-image
resistant, then H(I) is collision resistant.
3.2. Construction II: General construction
Our description of the general version (which appears in [3]) is from [8] for the case n− m > 1. (The case n− m = 1 is a
little more complicated. We do not mention it here since we will not consider such values of n and m for our constructions.)
Let H(II) be the extended domain hash function which is to be defined. Let x be a message to be hashed and we have to
define the digest H(II)(x). Write x = x1 ‖ x2 ‖ . . . ‖ xk, where |x1| = |x2| = · · · = |xk−1| = n− m− 1 and |xk| = n− m− 1− d
with 0 ≤ d ≤ n−m− 2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k− 1, let yi = xi; yk = xk ‖ 0d and yk+1 is the (n−m− 1)-bit binary representation of d.
Define z1 = h(IV‖0‖y1) and for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, define zi+1 = h(zi‖1‖yi+1). The digest of x under H(II) is zk+1, i.e., H(II)(x) = zk+1.
Note that the domain consists of all possible binary strings, i.e., there is no length restriction on the input message x. It
can be shown that H(II) is collision resistant assuming h to be only collision resistant. (See [8] for a proof.)
The number of padded bits consists of m bits of the IV; the bit 0 prepended to y1; the bit 1 prepended to each of y2 to yk+1; d
zeros appended to xk; and (n−m−1) bits for yk+1. This comes to a total of k+d+n bits. The value of k is d|x|/(n−m−1)e and the
maximum value of d is (n−m−2). Thus, the maximum number of bits that is padded is equal to 2n−m−2+d|x|/(n−m−1)e.
3.3. Construction III: SHA family construction
The specification of the SHA family of constructions uses a variant of the iterative hashing technique. We denote this
variant by H(III).
Let x be the message to be hashed. First we form the string: pad(x) = x ‖ 1 ‖ 0k ‖ binc(|x|), where c is a constant
such that c < n − m, binc(|x|) is the c-bit binary representation of x and k is the least non-negative integer such that
|x| + 1+ k ≡ (n−m− c)mod(n−m), or equivalently x+ c+ 1+ k ≡ 0 mod(n−m). The length of pad(x) is equal to l(n−m)
for some l ≥ 1. (For SHA-256, n = 768, m = 256 and c = 64.) The message digest is defined to be H(III)(x) = H(I)(pad(x)).
This construction can only handle messages of length less than 2c. Putting c = 64 (as in SHA-256) is usually sufficient for
all practical purposes. The construction can be proved to be collision resistant assuming h to be only collision resistant.
Padding consists of m bits of IV (as part of the H(I)(pad(x)) invocation) and the string 1‖0k‖binc(|x|) appended to x. The
total number of padded bits is then m+ c+ 1+ k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ n−m− 1. Hence, the maximum number of padded bits is
n+ c.
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Table 1
Comparison of features of different constructions for a message x
Cons. Domain sz. Length res. Padding # Invoc. Assumption on h( )
I Infinite |x| = i(n− m), i ≥ 1 None |x|n−m c.r. and p.i.r.
II Infinite None 2n− m− 2+
⌈ |x|
n−m−1
⌉
1+
⌈ |x|
n−m−1
⌉
c.r.
III 2c , c < n−m |x| < 2c , c < n− m n+ c a+
⌈ |x|
n−m
⌉
, a ∈ {0, 1} c.r.
IV < 2n−m |x| < 2n−m 2n− m− 1 1+
⌈ |x|
n−m
⌉
c.r.
3.4. Construction IV: Another length bounded construction
We define a function H(IV) which like H(III) can also hash all binary strings of a maximum possible length.
Let the message be x. Append the minimum number of zeros to x so as to make the length a multiple of (n−m). Now divide
x into l blocks x0, . . . , xl−1 of lengths (n − m) bits each. Define y0 = h(IV ‖ x0) and for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, define yi = h(yi−1 ‖ xi).
Finally define z = h(yl−1 ‖ w), where w is the (n−m)-bit binary representation of |x|, i.e. w = binn−m(|x|). The digest of x is z.
Clearly, this algorithm can be applied only when the length of x is less than 2n−m. Again, this construction can be proved to
be collision resistant assuming h to be only collision resistant.
Padding consists of m bits of the IV; k zeros which are appended to x to make the length a multiple of (n−m); and (n−m)
bits for the length of the message. This comes to a total of k+n bits. Since the maximum value of k is (n−m−1) the maximum
number of padded bits is 2n− m− 1.
3.5. Role of IV
Each of the constructions described above uses an m-bit string as an IV. The IV is essential in Construction I, since in
this construction we require h to be such that it is infeasible to find a pre-image of IV under h. On the other hand, for
Constructions II to IV, we can replace IV by the initial m bits of the message without affecting the collision resistance of the
extended domain hash function. If we do this, then in certain cases, we can hash an extra m bits without increasing the
number of invocations of h. In general, this is not a significant gain, though it may become significant if we repeatedly hash
short messages such as digital certificates.
3.6. Discussion
In Table 1, we compare the properties of the different constructions. For each construction, we provide the size of the
extended domain; the restriction on the lengths of messages to be hashed; the maximum amount of padding; the number
of invocations of h() that are made while extending the domain; and the security assumption made on h().
In our count of the number of padded bits, we also include the IV and the binary encoding of the length of the message.
The first construction is proved to be collision resistant under the assumption that h() is both collision resistant and pre-
image resistant, while the other three constructions can be proved to be collision resistant under the assumption that h()
is only collision resistant. Construction II can handle arbitrary length strings, while the Constructions III and IV can handle
bounded length strings. On the other hand, Constructions III and IV are more efficient than Construction II.
Question:
The theoretical question that now arises is whether it is possible to obtain a construction which can handle arbitrary
length strings, whose collision resistance is based only on the collision resistance of h and which is more efficient than
Construction II?
4. Difficulty of domain extension
For an integer i, let bin(i) denote the minimum length binary representation of i and for a binary string x, let χ(x) denote
the minimum length binary representation of the length of x, i.e., χ(x) = bin(|x|).
Construction V:
We want to define a function H(V) which can handle arbitrary length strings. As in Construction III, define
pad(x) = x ‖ 1 ‖ 0k ‖ bin(|x|)
= x ‖ 1 ‖ 0k ‖ χ(x)
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where k is the minimum non-negative integer which satisfies the equation |x| + |χ(x)| + 1 + k ≡ 0 mod(n − m). This
ensures that the length of pad(x) is equal to l(n − m) for some l ≥ 1 and hence we can apply the iterative technique as in
Construction III to compute the message digest. (The exact Construction III is obtained by substituting binc(|x|) for bin(|x|).)
The digest of x under H(V) is defined to be H(I)(pad(x)), i.e., H(V)(x) = H(I)(pad(x)). Since we do not put any bound on the
length of bin(|x|), this construction can handle arbitrary length strings. Let us now consider the correctness of Construction
V.
Condition 1:
Suppose h is both collision resistant and it is infeasible to find a pre-image of IV. Then, using an argument as in the case
of Construction I, it is possible to show by a backward induction that a collision for H(V) either provides a collision for h or a
pre-image of IV under h.
Condition 2:
Suppose that we want to assume h to be only collision resistant. We show that assuming h to be only collision resistant
is not sufficient to show the correctness of Construction V. Let us consider the meaning of this statement in more detail.
Suppose that there is some element in the range of h which has a unique pre-image. Then the ability to find this pre-image
(or even knowing it a priori) does not violate the collision resistance of h. On the other hand, the knowledge of this pre-image
can make it possible to construct a collision for H(V). This is the approach that we take below.
Our first task is to choose a suitable collision resistant h. For this, we must assume that some function h′() with suitable
parameters is collision resistant, as otherwise the question is moot. (See [1] for a similar situation in regard to universal
one-way hash functions.)
Suppose h′() is an (n,m′) collision resistant function, with m′ = m − 1 and n − m = 2τ ≥ 16. Further, let IV and σ be
arbitrary m-bit and (n−m)-bit strings respectively. Using h′, we define an (n,m) function h for which it is infeasible to find
collisions and for which IV ‖ σ is the only pre-image of IV. Write IV = IV′ ‖ b, where |IV′| = m− 1 and b is the last bit of IV.
For any n-bit string x, define
h(x) = IV if x = IV ‖ σ;
= h′(x) ‖ b if x 6= IV ‖ σ.
}
(1)
Here b denotes the complement of the bit b. (We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for simplifying our original
definition of h above.) Clearly, IV has the unique pre-image IV ‖ σ under h. On the other hand, any collision for h yields a
collision for h′. Hence, h is collision resistant if h′ is collision resistant. (Note that h is not surjective, but that is not relevant
to the assumption that h is collision resistant.) If we use Construction I to extend the domain of h, then we get a function H(I)
with the following property: H(I)(σi) = IV for all i ≥ 1, where σi denotes i many repetitions of σ.
The conversion from h′ to h works for any IV and σ. Choose IV to be an arbitrary m-bit string; and σ = y′ ‖ 1 ‖ 0τ−1 ‖ 1,
where y′ is an arbitrary string of length (n − m − 1 − τ). Then we can define the function h as above. (The justification for
choosing σ as above will become clear later.)
Consider the function H(V). This function is defined for any h and IV and hence also for h and IV defined as above. We show
that for such h and IV it is possible to exhibit a collision for H(V).
We define two strings x and x′ in the following manner. String x is a “short” string, while string x′ is a “long” string. Define
x = 0n−m−1−τ and then χ(x) = dlog(n− m− 1− τ)e = τ and hence
pad(x) = 0n−m−1−τ‖1‖χ(x).
We now define the string x′. First we set the length of x′ by defining χ(x′) = 1 ‖ pad(x) and hence |χ(x′)| = n− m+ 1. This
sets the length of x′ to be 2n−m+ (n−m)+|x|. At this point, we know that pad(x′) = x′ ‖ 1 ‖ 0τ−1 ‖ χ(x′). This sets the length
of pad(x′) to be 2n−m + 3(n − m). We write x′ = z′ ‖ y′ where |z′| = 2n−m + n − m. (Note |y′| = |x|, and we could, if we like,
choose y′ = x.) Recall σ = y′ ‖ 1 ‖ 0τ−1 ‖ 1 and is of length (n − m). We define z′ to be i many repetitions of σ, i.e., z′ = σi,
where i = 1+ 2n−m−τ . Thus, we can write
pad(x′) = σ2+2n−m−τ ‖ pad(x)
i.e., 2+ 2n−m−τ repetitions of σ followed by pad(x). Now,
H(V)(x′) = H(I)(pad(x′))
= H(I)(σ2+2n−m−τ ‖ pad(x))
= h(H(I)(σ2+2n−m−τ ), pad(x))
= h(IV, pad(x))
= H(I)(pad(x))
= H(V)(x).
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Clearly, x 6= x′ and hence we obtain a collision for H(V). Thus, H(V) is not collision resistant, even though h is collision resistant.
In fact, in the proof we have used the fact that IV has a unique and known pre-image under h.
In view of this, we consider the problem of extending the domain of a collision resistant hash function to be a non-trivial
problem.
5. DAG hashing
So far, we have considered iterated hashing. Our main task will be to provide a new construction for securely extending
the domain of a collision resistant hash function. We actually do this for a general class of hashing algorithms whose structure
can be described using a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
A DAG D is defined as D = (V, A) where V is a finite non-empty set of nodes and A is a set of arcs such that D contains
no directed cycles. For any node v of D, we will denote by Γ(v) (resp. ∆(v)) the set of all arcs coming into (resp. going out
of) v. It is well known (and easy to prove) that any DAG contains at least one node of indegree zero and at least one node of
outdegree zero. We make the following definition.
Definition 1. Let D = (V, A) be a DAG. A node with indegree zero will be called an exposed node; a node with outdegree
zero will be called an output node and all other nodes will be called internal nodes.
If v is an exposed node and u is an output node, we have Γ(v) = ∆(u) = ∅.
A DAG can have more than one output node. If there is exactly one output node, then this is the root of the DAG. Given
a DAG D, let l(D) be the maximum number of nodes on any path from an exposed node to an output node (counting both
the start and the end nodes). We will call l(D) to be the depth of D. If there is exactly one output node, then the depth is the
number of nodes on a maximal length of a path from an exposed node to the root node. We count nodes instead of arcs in
defining depth, since in our case each node will correspond to one invocation of the underlying compression function.
To each node v, of D we assign a non-negative integer called its level in the following manner. For each output node v
of D, set level(v) = l(D) − 1; drop all the output nodes from D to get a new DAG D1. For each output node of v of D1, set
level(v) = l(D) − 2; again drop all the output nodes from D1 to get a new DAG D2. Continue this process until all nodes of
D have been assigned level numbers. The level numbers of the nodes partition V into l disjoint subsets S0, . . . , Sl−1, where
l = l(D) and Si = {v : level(v) = i}. Note that all output nodes are at the same level, but the exposed nodes can be at different
levels. However, all nodes at level zero are necessarily exposed nodes.
An assignment α on D = (V, A) is a function α : A→ Nwhich assigns a positive integer to each arc of D. Let n and m be two
positive integers with n > m and D be a DAG. An assignment α is said to be proper with respect to (n,m,D) if the following
condition holds.
For any node v of D, (a)
∑
e∈∆(v)
α(e) = m and (b) ∑
e∈Γ(v)
α(e) ≤ n.
For any node v, we define the fan-in of v to beµ(v) =∑e∈Γ(v) α(e). Thus, for a proper assignment α on (n,m,D) and any node
v, we have µ(v) ≤ n. For any exposed node v, we have µ(v) = 0.
A structure is a tuple S = (n,m,D = (V, A),α)where α is a proper assignment on (n,m,D). By an exposed or output node
of a structure S we will mean an exposed or output node of the underlying DAG D. Similarly, by the depth of a structure we
will mean the depth of the underlying DAG.
5.1. Construction
Given a structure S and an (n,m) compression function h, we can define a hash function hS in the following manner. The
hash function takes as input a message x (whose length we specify later) and produces as output a digest y = h(x). The basic
idea is to invoke the hash function h for each node v of D. The function h takes n bits as input and produces m bits as output. To
ensure this we have to parse (or format) the message x properly. We first describe this formatting procedure. For any node
v, the input to v will be written as z(v) and the output of v will be written as y(v). The input z(v) is formed by concatenating a
part of the message x and some portions of the outputs of previous invocations of h as is made precise below. The substring
of the message which is provided as input to v is denoted by x(v) and is of length |x(v)| = n−µ(v). Suppose there are t nodes
in the DAG and V = {v1, . . . , vt}. As a notational convenience, and write xi = x(vi), zi = z(vi) and yi = y(vi).
We associate a non-empty string β(e) of length at most m to each arc e of D in the following manner. Let ∆(vi) =
{ei,1, . . . , ei,ki } and write yi = yi,1‖ . . . ‖yi,ki , where |yi,j| = α(ei,j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ ki. Then β(ei,j) = yi,j. For any node vi write
Γ(vi) = {ei,1, . . . , ei,ri }. Then the input zi to vi is formed by concatenating xi and β(ei,1), . . . ,β(ei,ri), i.e., zi = xi ‖ β(ei,1) ‖
. . . ‖ β(ei,ri). Note that the definition of zi imposes an implicit ordering on the ei,js. The actual ordering is not important as
long as one uses the ordering in a consistent manner. For any exposed node v, we haveΓ(v) = ∅ and consequently z(v) = x(v)
and |x(v)| = n. Given a message x, the computation of hS(x) is described as follows. For the description of the algorithm, we
assume that the nodes of each Si, 0 ≤ i ≤ l(D)− 1 have been arranged in a particular order. Again, the actual ordering is not
important, as long as the orderings are used consistently for different messages.
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Computation of hS(x)
1. For i = 0 to l(D)− 1 do
2. For vj ∈ Si
3. set yj = h(zj).
4. End do.
5. End do.
6. z = λ (the empty string).
7. For v ∈ Sl(D)−1 set z = z ‖ y(v).
8. Output z.
We say that the hash function hS is associated to the structure S and the compression function h.
Remark. The loop in Steps 2–4 involves the invocation of h for each node in Si. These invocations can be carried out in
parallel and hence a parallel execution of the algorithm will require exactly l(D)parallel rounds. Thus, the depth of a structure
determines the number of parallel rounds required to compute the output of the associated hash function.
5.2. Properties of hS
The following result describes the lengths of the input and output strings of the hash function hS .
Proposition 2. Let S = (n,m,D = (V, A),α) be a structure and h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a compression function. Then
hS : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}M where N = t(n− m)+ sm and M = sm, where t = |V| and s is the number of output nodes in D.
Proof. The outputs of all the output nodes are concatenated and provided as output of hS . The length of the output of each
node is m bits, hence the length of the output of hS is sm bits.
The calculation of the input size is as follows. There are t nodes in D. The function h is invoked once for each of these
nodes and hence h is invoked a total of t times. Each invocation of h requires an n-bit input. Thus, a total of tn bits are
required as input to all the invocations. An input to an invocation of h either comes directly from the message x or is a part
of the intermediate output of some previous invocation of h. There are (t− s) intermediate outputs which provide a total of
(t − s)m bits. Hence the message x has to provide a total of exactly tn− (t − s)m = t(n− m)+ sm bits. 
The next result shows that the construction described above preserves the property of collision resistance.
Theorem 3. Let hS be a hash function constructed from a structure S = (n,m,D,α) and a compression function h described as
above. Then, it is possible to find a collision for hS if and only if it is possible to find a collision for h.
Proof. Let D have a total of t nodes out of which s ≥ 1 nodes are output nodes. Then the length of the message being hashed
by hS is given by Proposition 2 and is equal to t(n−m)+ sm and the size of the digest is sm. In particular, note that hS works
on fixed length strings and the colliding messages x and x′ given in the If part below are both of length t(n− m)+ sm bits.
If: We have to show that any collision for h can be extended to a collision for hS . Let x1 and x′1 be distinct n-bit strings
which collide for h. Let v be an exposed node of the structure S. We now define two strings x and x′ in the domain of hS such
that x 6= x′ and hS(x) = hS(x′). Note that to define x and x′ it is enough to define the corresponding inputs x(u) and x′(u) to
each node u of S. We do this as follows: Set x(v) = x1, x′(v) = x′1 and for any u 6= v, set x(u) and x′(u) both to be equal to an
arbitrary binary string of appropriate length. Then it is clear that x 6= x′. Moreover, hS(x) = hS(x′) since the outputs of the
invocation of h at node v are equal and the inputs to all other nodes are equal. Thus, x and x′ provide a collision for h.
Only If: For 0 ≤ i ≤ l(D)− 1, we define three sequences of sets ZListi,XListi and YListi, where
XListi = {x(v) : level(v) = i}, ZListi = {z(v) : level(v) = i} and YListi = {y(v) : level(v) = i}.
Note that the message x can be written as a concatenation (in an appropriate order) of the strings in XListi for 0 ≤ i ≤ l(D)−1.
For the proof, assume that there are two messages x and x′ such that x 6= x′ but hS(x) = hS(x′). We show that it is possible
to find a collision for h. In the following, we will use primed and unprimed notations to denote quantities corresponding to
x′ and x respectively.
Our proof technique is the following. Assume that there is no collision for any of the invocations of h. We show that this
implies x = x′ which contradicts the hypothesis that x 6= x′. Hence, there must be a collision for some invocation of h. We
now turn to the proof of the fact that if there is no collision for h, then x = x′. This is proved by backward induction on i.
More precisely, we show that if there is no collision for h, then for each i, we have XListi = XList′i . Consequently, x = x′. We
now turn to the actual proof.
We are given that hS(x) = hS(x′). This implies that YListl(D)−1(x) = YList′l(D)−1(x′) and consequently for each v ∈ Sl(D)−1,
we have h(z(v)) = y(v) = y′(v) = h(z′(v)). Since there is no collision for h, we must have z(v) = z′(v) and consequently
ZListl(D)−1 = ZList′l(D)−1. This in turn implies that for each v ∈ Sl(D)−1 we have x(v) = x′(v) and for each u ∈ Sl(D)−2 we have
y(u) = y′(u). Hence XListl(D)−1 = XList′l(D)−1 and YListl(D)−2 = YList′l(D)−2.
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Fig. 1. Example of a structure and its underlying DAG. The (n,m) hash function to be used with this structure should satisfy n ≥ 2m.
For the induction step assume that we have shown that XListi+1 = XList′i+1 and YListi = YList′i for all i ≥ k + 1. Then
using an argument similar to the one given above it follows that XListi = XList′i and YListi−1 = YList′i−1. This shows that
XListi = XList′i for 1 ≤ i ≤ l(D) − 1. Now one more application of the previous argument shows that XList0 = XList′0. Hence
XListi = XList′i for all 0 ≤ i ≤ l(D)− 1 as desired. 
5.3. Example
A general DAG can have a complicated structure. In Fig. 1, we provide an example of a simple DAG which illustrates the
ideas behind the algorithm. Also, the DAG can be of interest for designing parallel hash functions.
The DAG in Fig. 1 has 34 nodes. Out of these, 15 nodes form a full binary tree, while the other 19 nodes are distributed
on 8 parallel paths ending in the leaves of the binary tree. The lengths of the parallel paths are either 3 or 4. The exposed
nodes are nodes Q11 to Q18; there is a unique output node, which is node P0.
Suppose we wish to extend the domain of an (n,m) hash function using the above DAG. For this we need to define an
assignment α, which assigns values to the edges. Our α assigns m to each edge. The nodes P0 to P6 have indegree 2 and hence,
for the assignment to be proper we must have 2m ≤ n.
Since there is exactly one output node, the size of the digest is m. Each of the nodes from Q11 to Q18 (the exposed nodes)
hash n bits of the message; nodes P7 to P14 and Q0 to Q11 each hash (n−m) bits of the message; and nodes P0 to P6 each hash
(n − 2m) bits of the message. The total number of bits in the message to be hashed is then 8n + 19(n − m) + 7(n − 2m) =
34n−33m = 34(n−m)+m bits, as given in Proposition 2. In other words, the structure defines a function from 34(n−m)+m
bits to m bits. Each of the nodes P0 to P6 have indegree 2. To make the hash function definition complete, we need to specify
an ordering of the incoming arcs for these nodes. We arbitrarily choose a left-then-right ordering.
If the underlying (n,m) hash function is collision resistant, then Theorem 3 shows that the hash function constructed by
the structure is also collision resistant. Note that the constructed function can only handle messages of a fixed length. Later
we show how to handle variable and arbitrary length messages.
5.4. A sketch for designing parallel hash functions
The number of levels in the DAG of Fig. 1 is 7. A parallel implementation with 8 hash invocation units can complete
hashing the entire message in 7 parallel rounds. Although, Fig. 1 shows a particular example, it is actually illustrative of a
more general principle for constructing parallel hash functions.
Suppose, we know a priori that at most 2p parallel hashing units will be available. Then, one can define a structure which
has a full binary tree with 2p leaf nodes and 2p parallel paths ending in these nodes. The paths can be chosen such that the
difference between the maximum and minimum length is at most one. If the number of parallel hashing units is less than 2p
(for example, it can be one in the sequential case), then it is easy to simulate the entire DAG using the available units. This
description is only a sketch and it is possible to work out the details in case one is interested in designing a parallel hash
function.
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6. Hashing arbitrary length strings
The hash function hS can handle only strings of one particular length. We would like to obtain a function which can
handle strings of any length. Techniques to handle arbitrary length strings have been introduced before by Damgård [3] (see
Construction II in Section 3.2) for the special case of structures where the underlying DAG is a directed path. It does not
seem to be easy to adapt the technique of [3] to the more general case of DAG that we consider here. Thus, we present a new
method for handling arbitrary length strings, which is also of independent interest. To describe the construction of hash
function which can handle arbitrary length strings we need to introduce an infinite family of DAGs. To keep the description
reasonably simple, we assume that each DAG in the family has a single output node. The precise definition of the family that
we consider is given below.
Let {Dk}k≥1 be a family of DAGs where Dk = (Vk, Ak) is such that |Vk| = k and Dk has exactly one output node. Given
positive integers n and m with n > m, a family of structures F is defined as F = {Sk}k≥1 where Sk = (n,m,Dk,αk), where
αk is a proper assignment on Dk. Given a compression function h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, and a family of structures F , we define
a family of hash functions {hk}k≥1, where hk = hSk . From Proposition 2, we have
hk : {0, 1}k(n−m)+m → {0, 1}m.
Note that h1 = h. From Theorem 3, we know that the ability to find a collision for any hk implies the ability to find a collision
for h.
We want to define a hash function which can handle strings of any length. Each hk can handle only fixed length strings.
More precisely, h1 can handle strings of length n, h2 can handle strings of length 2n − m, h3 can handle strings of length
3n − 2m and so on. First we need to “fill the gaps” in the lengths. For this we define a function h∗ : ∪i≥1{0, 1}i → {0, 1}m in
the following manner.
h∗(x) = h1(x ‖ 0n−|x|) if 1 ≤ |x| ≤ n;
= hk+1(x ‖ 0(k+1)(n−m)+m−|x|) if k(n− m)+ m < |x| ≤ (k+ 1)(n− m)+ m.
}
(2)
Note that the amount of padding done to x in the definition of h∗ is at most (n− 1) in the first case and at most (n−m− 1)
in the second case. The function h∗(x) is not collision resistant. For example, the images of the strings 1 and 10n−1 are same,
since h∗(1) = h(10n−1) = h∗(10n−1). We modify the function h∗(x) to a function h∞(x) : ∪i≥1{0, 1}i → {0, 1}m which is
collision resistant (assuming that h is collision resistant). To do this we first need to introduce a length extracting function.
Given a binary string x, recall thatχ(x) denotes the minimum length binary representation of the length of x. For example,
if x = 110001101010, then χ(x) = 1100, since the length of x is 12. The iterates of χ() are defined as usual: χ0(x) = x and
for i > 0, χi(x) = χ(χi−1(x)). The following result states some simple properties of the function χ(). Recall that the reverse
of a binary string y is denoted by yr .
Proposition 4. Let x be a binary string. Then
1. The first bit of y = χ(x) is 1 and hence the last bit of yr is also 1.
2. χ(x) = x if and only if x = 1 or x = 10.
3. |χ(x)| = 1+ blog |x|c = dlog(|x| + 1)e.
4. If |x| > 1, then there is a positive integer j, such that χj(x) = 10.
Remark. For the construction of h∞ given below to work, there must exist a j such that |Xj| ≤ n−m. If n−m = 1 and |x| > 1,
then this cannot be achieved. Thus, henceforth we will assume that n − m ≥ 2. From a practical point of view, this is not
really a constraint since all known practical compression functions satisfy this condition.
Now we are in a position to define the function h∞. Recall that xr denotes the reverse of the string x. Let IV be an
initialization vector, i.e., a string of length m.
Computation of h∞(x).
1. Define X0 = x and for i > 0, define Xi = χi(X0) = χ(Xi−1).
2. Let j be the least positive integer such that |Xj| ≤ n− m.
3. Define Y0 = h∗(IV‖0‖X0).
4. For 1 ≤ i ≤ j− 1, define Yi = h∗(Yi−1‖1‖Xi).
5. Yj = h∗(Yj−1 ‖ Xrj ).
6. Output Yj.
Remark. The value of j in the above algorithm will be more than one only if the length of the message is greater than 2n−m.
For practical compression functions (such as SHA, RIPEMD, etc.) the value of (n − m) is at least 128. Thus, for all practical
compression functions and practical sized messages the value of j will be equal to one.
We next prove that h∞ is collision resistant if h is collision resistant.
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Theorem 5. If there is an (, q, L)-algorithm to solve ALC(n,m, L) for h∞, then there is an (, q+2η)-algorithm to solve Col(n,m)
for h, where η is the number of invocations of h made by h∞ in hashing a message of length L.
Proof. Given any message x, the computation of the digest involves several invocations of the function h∗. At each stage, the
function h∗ in turn invokes hk on a suitably padded string. There are (j+1) invocations of h∗. Suppose that at the ith (0 ≤ i ≤ j)
invocation of h∗, the function hki is invoked. Also denote the padded input to hki by Wi. Thus, Y0 = h∗(IV‖0‖X0) = hk0(W0),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1, Yi = h∗(Yi−1‖1‖Xi) = hki(Wi) and Yj = h∗(Yj−1 ‖ Xrj ) = hkj(Wj). Further, we have |Wi| = ki(n − m) + m and
for 0 ≤ i ≤ j, |Yi| = m.
Assume that h∞(x) = h∞(x′) and x 6= x′. We show that this implies that there is a collision for h. The proof is by backward
induction. We will use primed and unprimed notation to denote the quantities corresponding to x and x′ respectively.
By hypothesis, we have h∞(x) = Yj = Y ′j′ = h∞(x′). From the definition of h∞ we have
h∗(Yj−1 ‖ Xrj ) = hkj(Wj) = Yj = Y ′j′ = hk′j′ (W
′
j′) = h∗(Y ′j′−1 ‖ X′
r
j′ ).
By definition of j and j′, we have |Xj|, |X′j′ | ≤ n−m and hence |Yj−1‖Xj|, |Y ′j′−1‖X′j′ | ≤ n. From the definition of h∗ it follows that
kj = k′j′ = 1 and |Wj| = |W ′j′ | = n. If Wj 6= W ′j′ then we obtain a collision for h1 and hence for h (since h = h1) and we are done.
On the other hand, if there is no collision for h, we must have Wj = W ′j′ . Hence
Wj = Yj−1‖Xrj ‖0n−m−|Xj| = Y ′j′−1‖X′
r
j′ ‖0n−m−|X
′
j′ | = W ′j′ .
Since both the strings Xrj and X′
r
j′ end with a 1, by the above condition we must have |Xrj | = |X′
r
j′ |. This implies Yj−1 = Y ′j′−1 and
Xj = X′j′ . Now there are two cases to consider.
Case j = j′: We have χ(Xj−1) = Xj = X′j′ = χ(X′j′−1) and hence |Xj−1| = |X′j′−1|. Thus, |Wj−1| = |W ′j′−1| and consequently
kj−1 = k′j′−1. Also we have
hkj−1(Wj−1) = Yj−1 = Y ′j′−1 = hk′j′−1(W
′
j′−1).
Using Theorem 3, we obtain that either Wj−1 = W ′j′−1 or we obtain a collision for h. In the second case, we are done and in
the first case we obtain Wj−1 = W ′j′−1 and consequently Yj−2 = Y ′j′−2 and Xj−1 = X′j′−1.
Repeating the above argument for i = j − 2, . . . , 1, we obtain that Wj−2 = W ′j′−2, Wj−3 = W ′j′−3, . . . ,W1 = W ′1 and
consequently Yj−3 = Y ′j′−3 and Xj−2 = X′j′−2, Yj−4 = Y ′j′−4 and Xj−3 = X′j′−3, . . . , Y0 = Y ′0 and X1 = X′1. Now we have
χ(X0) = X1 = X′1 = χ(X′0).
Consequently, |X0| = |X′0| and so |W0| = |W ′0|. This forces k0 = k′0. Thus, we have
hk0(W0) = Y0 = Y ′0 = hk0(W ′0).
Again using Theorem 3, we have that either there is a collision for h or W0 = W ′0. In the first case we are done and in the
second case, we have W0 = W ′0 and hence x = X0 = X′0 = x′ which contradicts the hypothesis. Hence there is a collision for
h.
Case j 6= j′: Without loss of generality assume that j′ > j and j′ − j = l > 0. Proceeding as in the above case, we have Y0 = Y ′l
and X1 = X′l+1. Again χ(X0) = X1 = X′l+1 = χ(X′l) and hence |X0| = |X′l | which implies |W0| = |W ′l |. This forces k0 = k′l . Thus,
we have
hk0(W0) = Y0 = Y ′l = hk′l (W ′l ).
The string W0 is formed by (possibly) padding 0’s to the end of IV‖0‖X0 and the string W ′l is formed by (possibly) padding 0’s
to the end of Y ′l−1‖1‖X′l . Thus, W0 and W ′l differ in the (m+ 1)th bit position and hence W0 6= W ′l . Hence by Theorem 3 there
must be a collision for h.
Let A be an (, q, L)-algorithm to solve ALC(n,m, L) for h∞. Then A is successful with probability  and in this case let
(x, x′) be the output of A. Thus, |x|, |x′| ≤ L and so h∞ invokes h at most η times for hashing either x or x′. The algorithm B
to solve Col(n,m) for h is as follows. B first executes A. If A fails, then B also fails. If A succeeds and returns (x, x′), then
B invokes h∞ on both x and x′ and “scans backwards” until a collision for h is found. By the above discussion, if (x, x′) is a
collision for h∞, then with probability one, the backward scan will produce a collision for h. Thus, the success probability of
B is also . Further, the number of invocations of h made byB is found as follows: q times during the execution ofA and at
most η times each on x and x′, giving a total of at most q+ 2η invocations. 
7. Comparison to iterated hashing
In this section, we perform a comparison of the new construction to the several variations of the Merkle–Damgård
constructions. Before getting into the details, we would like to point out a few things.
1096 P. Sarkar / Discrete Applied Mathematics 157 (2009) 1086–1097
• Our construction is more general in the sense that it works over an arbitrary DAG, whereas the variations of
the Merkle–Damgård algorithm works only with dipaths. Also, we would like to point out that the mechanism in
Merkle–Damgård algorithm for handling arbitrary length strings and the associated argument does not carry over to
the case of arbitrary DAGs.
• The detailed comparison that we present below is only to Construction II, since this is the algorithm which can hash
arbitrary length strings and assumes h to be only collision resistant.
7.1. Padding efficiency
The function h∞ performs some amount of padding to the string x before hashing it. We determine the maximum amount
of padding that is done and show that this is (asymptotically) less than the amount of padding performed in Construction II.
Given integer i, we define log∗(i) to be the least integer k such that
log(log(. . . (log(︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
|x|) . . .)) ≤ 1.
Note that the parameters n and m of the compression function h are independent of the message length |x| and can be
assumed to be constant in an asymptotic analysis.
Proposition 6. Let x be a binary string with |x| > n. Then the maximum amount of padding done to the string x in the computation
of h∞(x) is
n+ j(n− m)+ |χ(x)| + |χ2(x)| + · · · + |χj−1(x)|
where j is the minimum positive integer such that |χj(x)| ≤ n− m.
Proof. The maximum amount of padding in Step 3 is m + 1 + (n − m − 1). In Step 4, there is a loop; for each value of i
(1 ≤ i ≤ j− 1) the maximum amount of padding is 1+ |Xi| + (n−m− 1) = (n−m)+ |χi(x)|. The padding in Step 5 is equal
to (n− m). Adding up all these gives the required result. 
The maximum amount of padding done to x in Construction II is 2n − m − 2 +
⌈ |x|
n−m−1
⌉
(see [8]). Assuming n and m to
be constants, the amount of padding is O(|x|). On the other hand, assuming n and m to be constants, the maximum amount
of padding in our algorithm is bounded above by O((log∗ |x|)(log |x|)). Hence, in an asymptotic sense our padding scheme is
more efficient than the Merkle–Damgård padding scheme. The asymptotic inefficiency in the Merkle–Damgård construction
arises due to the fact that one bit of padding is done to each message block.
7.2. Invocation efficiency
We compare the invocation efficiency of our algorithm to Construction II, i.e., we compare the number of invocations of
the compression function h for a message x made by Construction II and our algorithm.
We first compute the number of invocations of h made by our algorithm. The algorithm to compute h∞ invokes h∗ exactly
j + 1 times, i.e., for i = 0, . . . , j. Suppose as in the proof of Theorem 5 that the ith invocation of h∗ is made on the string Wi
which is obtained by possibly padding 0s to IV‖0‖X0 if i = 0; to Yi−1‖1‖Xi if 1 ≤ i ≤ j− 1; and to Yj−1 ‖ Xj if i = j. Then from
Proposition 2, it follows that |Wi| = (n−m)(ki−1)+n. Now |Wi| = m+1+|Xi|+|αi| for 0 ≤ i ≤ j−1 and |Wj| = m+|Xj|+|αj|,
where αis are the all zero strings which are used as pads to obtain the Wis. Further, |αi| ≤ n− m − 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ j. Thus,
we obtain ki =
⌈ |Xi|+1
(n−m)
⌉
if 0 ≤ i ≤ j− 1; and ki =
⌈ |Xi|
(n−m)
⌉
if i = j. The value of ki is the number of invocations of h made by hki .
Note that kj = 1. Hence the total number of invocations of h made in the computation of h∞ is obtained by adding all the kis
and is given in the following result.
Proposition 7. The total number B of invocations of h made in the computation of h∞ is equal to
B =
⌈ |x| + 1
n− m
⌉
+
⌈ |χ(x)| + 1
n− m
⌉
+ · · · +
⌈ |χj−1(x)| + 1
n− m
⌉
+ 1.
In Construction II, the number of invocations A of the compression function h is equal to A = 1 +
⌈ |x|
n−m−1
⌉
. On the other
hand, the number B of invocations of h in our algorithm is given by Proposition 7. Note that j ≤ log∗ |x|. Using this fact and
some simple algebraic simplification we obtain
A− B > |x|
(n− m)(n− m− 1) −
n− m+ 1+ log∗ |x|(n− m+ 2+ log |x|)
n− m
> 0
for sufficiently large |x|. Thus, in an asymptotic sense, our algorithm is more efficient than the Merkle–Damgård algorithm.
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Table 2
Comparison to Merkle–Damgård algorithm for strings of length less than 2n−m
Max padding (in bits) Number of invocations
Construction II 2n− m− 2+
⌈ |x|
n−m−1
⌉
1+
⌈ |x|
n−m−1
⌉
h∞ 2n− m 1+
⌈ |x|+1
n−m
⌉
Proposition 7 shows that the number of invocations is independent of the actual structure of the underlying DAG. The
number of invocations depends only on the parameters n andm of the compression function and the length |x| of the message
to be hashed. This may appear to be counter-intuitive but is actually true. In fact, Proposition 2 shows that if the number of
nodes and the number of output nodes in the DAG is fixed, then the length of the input and the length of the output is also
fixed. The number of nodes is also the number of invocations of the compression function. If we reverse this argument, then
fixing the length of the input and the output, fixes the number of nodes in the DAG and hence the number of invocations of
the compression function. Proposition 7 proves this in the more general situation where a family of DAG is considered.
Having said this, we also note that even though the number of invocations does not depend on the actual structure of the
DAG, other parameters of practical interest do indeed depend on the actual structure. For example, the number of levels in
the DAG determine the number of parallel rounds required to hash a message. The number of levels in turn depend on the
structure of the DAG. For practical applications, a structure similar to that shown in Fig. 1 can be of interest. A sketch of a
more general construction is given in Section 5.4.
7.3. Concrete values
In Table 2, we compare h∞ to Construction II, for strings of length less than 2n−m. The maximum padding made by h∞ is
less than that made by Construction II if |x| > 2(n − m − 1); and the number of invocations made by h∞ is less than that
made by Construction II if |x| > (n − m − 1)(2(n − m) + 1). If n = 768 and m = 256 (as in SHA-2), then for |x| > 1022, h∞
performs lesser padding; and for |x| > 522753 makes lesser number of invocations.
8. Concluding remarks
Consider the problem of secure domain extension to arbitrary length strings. Both Construction II and our algorithm
perform this task. We have shown that our algorithm improves upon the Merkle–Damgård algorithm both in terms of
reducing the amount of padding and the number of invocations. This suggests the following two problems.
Lower Bound: LetA be an algorithm which securely extends the domain of a collision resistant compression function h to
arbitrary length strings. What is the minimum amount of padding and minimum number of invocations of h that
A has to make on an input x of length |x|?
Construction: Is there a construction which improves upon our algorithm?
The resolution of these questions can form tasks for future research.
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